Previous research has demonstrated information effects of buyer initiated traders are greater vis-à-vis seller initiated trades. We develop a theoretical model that predicts this difference is greater in bear markets than in bull markets, consistent with the (almost counter-intuitive) proposition that buy trades are relatively more informed in bear markets. Using a sample of trades executed on the NYSE in bull and bear markets, we find evidence consistent with our theoretical model. 
Introduction
A large set of literature has examined the price impact of large or block trades in securities markets, Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) are typical 2 . Using a sample of block buyer and seller initiated trades executed on the New York Stock Exchange between 1982 and 1984 they find three asymmetries in the impact of block purchases and sales. First, the total price impact of purchases is greater than sales. That is the magnitude of the difference between the price at which a block purchase is executed relative to the equilibrium price prior to the trade, is greater than the magnitude of the difference in the price at which a block sale is executed relative to the equilibrium price prior to the trade. Second, they find an asymmetry in the so-called "temporary" price impact of trades. That is, prices reverse following block sales but continue moving upwards following block purchases, implying block sellers pay a liquidity premium to trade whereas block purchasers do not. Third, they find the permanent price impact associated with purchases is greater than sales. That is, that the magnitude of the change in the price of a stock from the equilibrium price prior to a block purchase to the equilibrium price following the purchase, is greater than the magnitude of the change in the price of a stock from the equilibrium price prior to a block sale to the equilibrium price following the sale. This implies that, on average, block purchases convey more information to the market than block sales. 2 See also Kraus and Stoll (1972) ; Mayers (1987, 1990) ; Madhavan (1995, 1996) ; Lakonishok, (1993, 1995) ; Gemmill, (1996) and Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) . Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) extend previous work, by examining the total price impact of trades in bull and bear markets. Using "packages" of sell trades and buy trades executed by institutional investors in 37 countries including the USA, they find that the magnitude of the total price impact of buys is greater than the magnitude of the total price impact of sells in a bull market period sampled from 1997 and a bear market period sampled from 2001. Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004, p.871) conclude that "our results seem to suggest that due to large trade sizes the institutional trades tend to be affected by market conditions and pay a higher premium for liquidity when they trade on the same side of the market. This finding suggests that the liquidity available to buy (sell) orders is higher in bearish (bullish) markets. This explanation of the asymmetry in price impact is very intuitive and, yet, was not explored in the previous studies because they were all conducted when the market was in a bullish phase." Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) examine the total effects of trades, they do not examine the permanent or information effects of trades. Consequently, we extend the Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) analysis by examining the information effects of large or block trades in bull and bear markets. We develop and test a theoretical model based on Easley and O'Hara (1987) which produces somewhat counter-intuitive predictions of the information effect of block buy trades relative to sell trades in bull and bear markets. To our knowledge, no other study has examined the information effects of block buy and sell trades in bull and bear market conditions.
In our sequential trading model traders are allowed to transact in block (large) or small quantities. Risk neutral informed traders prefer to trade in blocks at any given price.
Consequently, the market maker sets a wider spread for block trades. However, if the market width is large enough, informed traders place only large orders and small orders are uninformative in equilibrium.
3 A crucial assumption in our analysis is that informed traders are averse to short sales. This behavioural assumption gives informed traders a disincentive to sell the asset and can reduce the information content of sell orders. We show that, if the market width is large enough, so that informed traders only place large orders, the information effects of block buys is always larger than the information effects of block sells, because of the short sales aversion. We find that contrarian signals are more valuable than confirming signals. Traders receiving an adverse signal on the true asset value have a larger informational advantage than traders receiving a favourable signal if the market is in a bull phase and lower informational advantage if the market is in a bear phase. This yields the empirical implication that the difference between the information effects of block purchases and sales is higher in bear markets than in bull markets.
We analyze a sample of individual transactions (not packages) executed in S&P 500 stocks during the bull and bear market periods identified by Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) . Using a method similar to Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) we verify, for our sample of trades, the asymmetry in the permanent price impact of trades across the bull and bear market. Further, we verify the finding of Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) using our sample of individual transactions, and find that the total price impact of buys is greater than sales in a bull market and the total price impact of sells is greater than buys in a bear market. We then proceed to test the main prediction of our theory. Consistent with our theory, we find that the permanent price impact of purchases is greater than the information effects of sales and that this difference is greater in bear markets than bull markets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section two we describe the theoretical model. In section three we derive empirical predictions about the asymmetric price impact of block trades in bear and bull markets. In section four we describe our data and method used to test the theoretical predictions of the model. In section five we report the results of our analysis, while section six provides a summary and conclusion.
All proofs of propositions are in the appendix.
Model

The economy
We consider a sequential trading model analogous to Easley and O'Hara (1987) , simplified because there is no event uncertainty. The market is for a risky asset which is exchanged among a sequence of risk neutral traders and competitive market makers who are responsible for quoting prices. The liquidation value of the asset can be low ( or high ( . The ex-ante probability of is Trades occur sequentially, with only one trader allowed to transact at any point in time.
The trader whose turn it is to transact may either buy a small or a large quantity, or sell a small or a large quantity, or refrain from trading . We denote order size and for small and large orders, respectively (hence )
S and B , as sell and a buy order respectively, for quantity , with i = S, L, and we indicate NT as no trading.
There are two types of traders: liquidity traders (fraction ) and institutional traders (fraction µ). We assume that liquidity traders choose any action in with equal probability and denote the likelihood that a liquidity trader submits a given order as . Institutional traders privately observe a signal perfectly correlated with the final asset value. 4 We denote the expected asset value of an informed trader by . 5 Since private signals are perfect, it is equal to 1 if and to 0 in the other case. Institutional traders choose the trading strategy that maximizes their profits given the quoted bid and ask prices. However, we assume because of short sale restrictions, they limit themselves to selling the asset only if it is in their portfolio. 6 The fraction of informed traders who own the asset and, hence, can sell it is . Before a trader arrives, each market maker sets bid and ask prices at which he is willing to trade each asset quantity. We denote the probability that the market makers attach to at time t by and the market makers' expectation by . Since = 0 and = 1, .
We define the market as flat when the low and the high liquidation asset values are equally likely, as bearish when the low is more likely than the high asset value and as bullish when the high is more likely than the low asset value. Hence, a flat market is characterized by , a bear market by , and a bull market is characterized by ,. 4 All results remain true even if private signals are imperfect. 5 We use the terms "institutional traders" and "informed traders" interchangeably.
6 Keim and Madhavan (1995) propose the traders aversion to short selling as a possible reason for differences in the information content of trades. They suggest that buy are more informationally motivated than sells because institutional traders can choose between many potential assets to buy, but when they sell, they usually can choose only between assets they already own due to short selling constraints.
Equilibrium strategies and prices
At the beginning of any trading round t, the market maker sets her quotes. We denote the best price schedule at time t by P t . Clearly
where B L,t and A L,t are the bid and the ask prices for the large orders, whilst B S,t and A S,t are the bid and the ask prices for the small orders.
After prices are set, a trader is randomly selected to trade, observes the price schedules and executes his strategy at the best price, or refrains from trading. If he is a liquidity trader, he acts in an ex-ante specified probabilistic way. If he is informed, he chooses the strategy that maximizes his expected profit given the price schedule.
The market maker anticipates the traders' strategy and announces her price schedule.
Bertrand competition restricts the market makers to earn zero expected profit from each trade. Hence, the trader arriving at t faces a price schedule that satisfies:
(1) for all .
Since the market makers are imperfectly informed about the liquidation asset value, competitive prices are always between 0 and 1. If the true asset value is high, institutional traders receive the good signal and buy the asset when they arrive at a market maker. On the other hand, if the true asset value is low, institutional traders receive the bad signal and sell the asset if it is in their portfolio (with probability ) when they arrive at a market maker. It is clear that, since private signals are perfect, the probability of an informed buyer conditional on the low asset value, and the probability of an informed seller conditional on the high asset value are both zero. This implies that for both small and large orders.
From Easley and O'Hara (1987) we know that, depending on the parameters of the model, two outcomes may prevail on each side of the market. If informed traders prefer to trade only a large quantity, they are separated from small liquidity traders and a separating equilibrium arises. If informed traders submit either small or large orders with strictly positive probability, a pooling equilibrium occurs.
We first examine the market in the separating equilibrium. In this market, the competitive price schedule, , is such that informed traders place only large orders (or refrain from trading if they observe the bad signal and do not own the asset).
Thus, small trades are not information-based and do not affect the public belief about the true asset value, while the information content of large trades is very strong. This implies that the equilibrium price for small orders is given by:
and the equilibrium prices for large orders are given by:
where and are the probabilities of a large sell order conditional on = 0 and = 1, respectively, and and are the probabilities of a large buy order conditional on = 1 and = 0, respectively. 7 Due to short selling constraints, information-motivated purchases are more likely than information-motivated sales. The separating equilibrium arises if, given the price schedule , informed traders prefer to trade only the large quantity. This occurs when the profit due to the larger quantity exceeds the better price available for small trades, that is when (2) where and are the separating marginal profits of an institutional trader when the final asset value is low and high, respectively, and and represent the deviation marginal profits, that is, the marginal profits of an institutional trader who deviates from the "separating" strategy when the final asset value is low and high, respectively. 8 Rearranging terms and substituting the price schedule , Condition (2) becomes (3) with , for the bid side of the market, and (4) with , for the ask side of the market. The left side of Conditions (3) and (4) represents the market width. For the separating equilibrium to prevail, it has to be larger than the ratio between the deviation and the separating marginal profits on each side of the market.
Conditions (3) and (4) highlight firstly, that the ratio between deviation and separating marginal profits of an institutional seller reduces when the public belief increases and, then, on the bid side the separating equilibrium is more likely to arise in bull rather than bear markets ( is, indeed, decreasing in ), and secondly, that the ratio between deviation and separating marginal profits of an institutional buyer reduces when the public belief decreases and, then, on the ask side it is more likely to arise in bear rather than in bull markets ( is, indeed, increasing in ). To gain some intuition, consider the ask side of the market. The difference between the profit from buying the large and the small quantity can be written as follows
. (5) The first term represents the separating gain due to the greater quantity of asset bought and the second term is the loss due to the higher price paid to purchase the first Q S units of the asset. An institutional trader observing the good signal chooses to buy large with probability 1 if this difference is positive. An increase in the public belief affects both those components of the difference between the profit from buying the large and the small quantity. The effect on the separating gain is negative since the ask price is increasing in . The effect on the loss due to the higher price paid to purchase the first Q S units of the asset is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of . Indeed, when is 0 or 1 the distance between and is zero, whilst it grows as the uncertainty in the market increases (i.e., tends to 1/2). This implies that the impact of an increase in the public belief on ( -) is positive for low values of and becomes negative as grows enough. Since (5) is positive if and only if Condition (4) is satisfied, we can conclude that the first effect dominates the second one is, indeed, equal to .
The more severe short selling constraints are (lower ), the more the separating equilibrium is likely in the bid side of the market. The adverse selection problem on the bid side of the market is less severe when is low, since the probability of an information-motivated sell order is lower. As a consequence, the bid price for the large quantity is nearer to bid price for the small quantity and the incentive to sell a large quantity for an institutional seller is higher.
If Conditions (3) and (4) are not satisfied on either side of the market, then there can be no separating equilibrium on that side of the market and the pooling equilibrium will arise. In the pooling equilibrium there is a positive probability of the informed trading in both large and small quantities. More precisely, an institutional trader plays a mixed strategy defined on the simplex , if he observes the bad signal and the asset is in its portfolio. He plays the mixed strategy defined on the simplex if he observes the good signal.
For any and , the competitive prices are given by:
for all . For the competitive price schedule to prevail, informed traders must be indifferent between trading the large or the small quantity. This condition requires: ,
.
It is easy to see that Conditions (7) and (8) can be satisfied only if the price schedule is such that and . This, in turn, implies that institutional traders are more likely to place the large than the small order.
The pooling equilibrium prevails if Condition (2) is not satisfied, that is, if the relative distance between deviation and separating profits is larger than the market width. From the previous paragraph we know that private signals are more valuable when they indicate the opposite asset value with respect to the public belief. More precisely, if the liquidation asset value is low, the distance between deviation and separating profits of institutional traders (sellers) is larger when the public belief (and, then, the bid price) is higher, whilst if the liquidation asset value is high, the distance between deviation and separating profits of institutional traders (buyers) is larger when the public belief (and, then, the ask price) is lower. As a consequence, informed sellers are more prone to separate themselves from small liquidity traders in bullish markets and the probability of a large information-based sell, , is increasing in , whilst institutional buyers are more prone to separate themselves from small liquidity traders in bearish markets and the probability of a large information-based buy, , is decreasing in .
The price impact of large trades
In our model, the price impact of a trade is the change in the public belief about the liquidation asset value due to that trade. Since institutional traders never sell when observing the good signal and never buy when observing the bad signal, the price impact of a sell is always negative and the price impact of a buy is always positive. The magnitude of the price impact of a trade depends both on the trade's information content and the weight the market maker attaches to this information.
The information content of a trade is related to its likelihood ratio, given by the ratio between the probability of the trade conditional to and the probability of the trade conditional to . If a trade is totally uninformative about the true asset value then its likelihood ratio is equal to 1. The more informative the trade is, the more its likelihood ratio differs from 1. Specifically, the more informative is a sell, the more its likelihood ratio is higher than 1 and the more informative is a buy, the more its likelihood ratio is lower than 1. Consequently, we can define the information content of a sell as its likelihood ratio and the information content of a buy as the reciprocal of its likelihood ratio.
The weight the market maker attaches to the information content of a trade is related to the uncertainty about the assets fundamental value. When the market is characterised by high uncertainty regarding the true asset value (that is, when is sufficiently far from 0 and 1), then the market maker attaches a high weight to the trades' information content.
But, when the public belief converges to the low or to the high asset value, then the importance of the trades' information content is lower.
Given the unconditional public belief , the price impact measure of a large sell is ,
where is the sales information content, conditional on the public belief, and the price impact measure of a large buy is ,
where is the purchase information content, conditional on the public belief. Notice that, on both sides of the market, the price impact of a large trade is increasing in its information content, and that both and are zero when is equal to 0 or 1.
Let the price impact asymmetry expression of the asset for large trades to be defined as (11) is larger than, equal to, or lower than 0 if and only if the price impact of a large buy is, respectively, larger than, equal to, or lower than the price impact of a large sell.
Proposition 1. If the market width is large enough and the short selling constraints are significant then the price impact of a large buy is always larger than the price impact of a large sell.
When the market width is high (i.e., is large), the separating equilibrium arises for all public beliefs and the information content of trades is on the bid side and on the ask side of the market. In the absence of short selling constraints, and the sign of would depend on the public belief. However, if short selling constraints are severe, i.e., is fairly small, sell orders coming from institutional traders are quite unlikely. As a consequence, large sells have small information content (lower than large buys) and, then, their price impact is always lower than that of buys. With low market width this result may not be true.
Indeed, if is low, the ask side of a bullish market could be characterized by the pooling equilibrium, whilst the bid side by the separating equilibrium (see Conditions (4) and (3)). In this case, the probability that a trader observing the good signal buys the asset ( ) could be lower than the probability that a trader observing the bad signal sells the asset , despite the short selling constraints. This would imply that large sells have higher information content than large buys and, then, their price impact would be greater than that of buys.
The public belief about an asset value captures the equilibrium price prior to a trade.
Recall that a bullish market is characterized by and a bearish market by . This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. The price impact asymmetry expression is higher in a bear market than in a bull market.
The rationale for the result in Proposition 2 is that the equilibrium bid and ask prices for large trades can be viewed as the weighted averages between the public belief and the asset assessment of institutional sellers or buyers. In a bull market, the public belief is nearer to the asset assessment of institutional buyers than to the asset assessment of institutional sellers, whilst the opposite is true in a bear market. As a consequence, all other things being equal, in a bull market the price impact of a large buy (i.e., the distance between the ask price and the public belief) is lower than that of a large sell (i.e., the distance between the public belief and the bid price), whilst in a bear market the price impact of a large buy is larger. This issue is amplified by the fact that in a bull market the information content of large buys cannot exceed that of large sells, and in a bear market the information content of large sells cannot exceed that of large buys.
Indeed, the profit of traders observing a signal contrary to the price path, that is, a good signal in a bear market or a bad signal in a bull market, is larger and induces them to be more aggressive, that is, to trade the large quantity with higher probability.
Data and method
The theory developed in the previous section implies that the asymmetry in the permanent price impact of block trades (i.e., that the permanent price impact of buys is greater than sales) is greater in a bear market than in a bull market. Following Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004), the bull market period examined in this study extends from 1 January to 31 December 1997, the bear market period extends over the first quarter of 2001. The data set available for this study is similar to the data set examined by Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers(1990) in that it is trade and quote data. In contrast, Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) examined packages of trades executed by single institutions. We begin the analysis by verifying the asymmetry in the price impact of a sample of block trades across the entire sample period (both bull and bear) using a research method similar to Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) , but updated to take into account recent developments in research design and peculiarities of the sample periods we examine.
We consider all trades executed in stocks in the S&P 500 traded on the New York Stock After partitioning trades into buyer or seller initiated, we identify a sample of "block"
trades. We rely on Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) definition and sample the 50 largest blocks by trade direction for each stock over each sample period examined (i.e., bull market period, bear market period and both combined bull and bear market periods).
The price effects of block trades are measured as follows:
P where is the equilibrium market price prior to the block transaction, and is the equilibrium price after a block trade has been executed. represents the price of the block trade.
In this study two proxies are utilised for equilibrium prices prior and post block trade execution. Following Chiyachantana et al (2004) closing prices on the day before a trade is executed are used as a proxy for , where the closing price is the price of the last trade before 4.00pm. For analysis of price effects measured intraday as in Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) , the trade price immediately preceding the block is used to proxy , while the transaction price five minutes after the block trade are used to proxy for respectively. Rather than sample post block prices in transaction time as in Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) , we sample prices in calendar time, as we find that there are large differences in the time between trades during the bull and bear market periods examined.
To isolate the price impact caused by large trades, we implement a control to analyze price effects using intraday data. Specifically, price effects of block trades are compared to the price effects of a sample of non-block trades. Following Holthausen, Leftwich and
Mayers (1990) we match each block transaction with a 100-share transaction of the same trade direction (i.e., buyer or seller initiated) by searching 16 trades prior to the block trade. The difference between the price impacts of block and non-block trades is referred to as the net effect. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the initial sample of block transactions examined in this study. Table 1 shows that there are 19,000 buy and sell transactions sampled across the full sample period. The average trade size of purchases is approximately $ 4.9 million or 120,300 shares while the average size of sales is $ 5.6 million or 139,204 shares confirming that they are block trades by any definition, the NYSE definition of a block trade is 10,000 or more shares. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the sample of trades in the bull and bear markets. Table 1 shows there is evidence that trades sampled during the (earlier) bull market period were larger than those in the (later) bear market period, both in shares as well as in dollar value terms.
Results
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) find that the total price effect of block buys is predominately permanent and there is very little evidence of a temporary price impact (or reversal following the trade), while the total price effect of block sales contains a temporary component that is significantly reversed following the block trade. Table 1 shows the total, temporary and permanent price effects for block purchases and sales examined in this study across the entire combined sample period (i.e., in both bull and bear markets). Our sample of block trades behaves very similarly to Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) . Specifically, there is no evidence of a price reversal following block purchases. The temporary price effect following block purchases is also negative, implying the price continues moving upwards after a block purchase, even after controlling for normal market movements following purchases using the non-block sample. Further, the temporary price effect following block sales is also negative, implying the price rebounds after block sales, even after controlling for normal market movements following sales using the non-block sample. Similarly to Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) we conclude that the total price impact of block trades is predominately permanent while the total price impact following block sales contains both a temporary and permanent component. A comparison of the permanent price impact of block buys and sales confirms that both the raw and net permanent effects of block buys are greater than block sales. A t-test that examines whether the difference in the magnitude of the permanent price impact of block buys is greater than sales is reported in Panel C, and confirms that the difference is significant at conventional levels of significance. We conclude that the price impact asymmetry reported by Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) and others is also present in our (entire) sample.
Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) examine the total price impact of institutional trades during the bull and bear market periods examined in this study. For a sample of transactions executed on the NYSE during these sample periods Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004, p.884) report " [the] patterns of price impact of institutional trading in US stocks (not reported in Table III ) are just as striking; 0.59 percent for purchases and 0.21 percent of sells in 1997 in contrast to 0.16 percent for purchases and 0.83 percent for sells in 2001." Hence, they find that the total price impact of buys is greater than sells in bull markets, while the total price impact of sells is greater than buys in a bear market. We do not have data on trade packages, just individual trades, hence we re-examine the Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) hypothesis during the bull and bear sample periods to determine whether their results hold despite the methodological and sample differences between this study and theirs. Table 3 reports the total impact of buy and sell trades during bull and bear market sample periods. Recall that similarly to Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) table confirms that the magnitude of the differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. In contrast, for bear markets, the magnitude of the total price impact of sells (-0.4260) is greater than buys (0.3349), and again a t-test reported at the bottom of the table confirms that the magnitude of the differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. Hence, Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) results are robust to any methodological differences. Having established that our sample behaves entirely like those in previous research in that (1) there is evidence of an asymmetry in the price impact of trades across the entire sample period, and (2) the total price impact of buys is greater than sells in a bull market while the reverse is true in a bear market, we now move to tests of our theory. Specifically, we examine the permanent price impact of buy and sell trades in bull and bear markets. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4 . Table 4 shows the permanent price impact of purchases is greater than the permanent price impact of sales in both bull and bear markets. However, consistent with our theory, the differences between the two are greater in a bear market (4 basis points) than in a bull market (2 basis points). Furthermore, a significance test is reported in Panel B, that confirms that the differences in the price impact of buys and sells across the bull and bear market periods are statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with our theoretical proposition that buys are relatively more informative than sells in bear markets relative to bull markets.
Following Chiyachantana, Jain, Jiang and Wood (2004) we examine the asymmetry in price impact of block trades for each of the months sampled. Figure 1 depicts the differences between the average permanent price impact of buy and sell trades for each month in our sample drawn from the bear market period (1997) and bull market period (2001) . The diagram illustrates that during the months drawn from the bear market that the price impact of buys over sells is generally greater (positive) and higher than in the months drawn from the bull market period. There are three months that represent an exception to this during the bull market period, however in two of those months (March and August 1997) the average return on the market was negative and, hence, in those months in can be argued that the market was in fact bearish. On the balance, there is evidence consistent with our hypothesis that buy trades have a greater permanent impact on prices than sell trades during bear markets.
Summary and conclusion
Previous research has identified a "puzzle" in the price impact of block trades, finding that the information effects of block buy trades is generally greater than the information effects of block sell trades. Another strand of literature has examined the total price effects of buy and sell transactions in bull and bear markets. This paper extends this literature by examining the information effects of block buy trades and block sell trades in bull and bear market conditions. We develop a theoretical model which predicts that this difference in the magnitude of the information conveyed by buy trades over sell trades is greater in bear markets than bull markets, consistent with the (almost counterintuitive) proposition that buy trades are relatively more informed in bear markets. Using a sample of trades executed on the NYSE in bull and bear market period identified in previous research, we find evidence consistent with our theoretical proposition.
Step 1 
that is positive since by assumption. Similarly, substituting (10) in and rearranging terms gives ,
that is negative since . By combining (13) and (14) with (12) we can conclude that is negative.
Step 2 
Deriving (10) with respect to and rearranging terms gives that is positive for all . This implies that for all
. (16) By combining (15) and (16) with (12) we can conclude that ,
that is negative since by assumption.
Step 3. In the equilibrium, the information content of large sell orders is such that and the information content of large buy orders is such that for all .
We will prove the proposition for the ask side of the market. The proof for the bid side is symmetric and will be omitted. From the proof of Proposition 1 we already know that if the separating equilibrium prevails on the ask side of the market both when and when , then . The function in
Condition (4) Table 4 Permanent price impact of block trades in bull and bear markets
The table presents estimates of the net permanent impact costs of block transaction in the bear market of first quarter 2001 and the bull market of 1997. The net permanent price impact is defined as the difference in permanent price effect is of block and nonblock transactions (i.e., a matched 100-share transaction of the same trade direction occurring 16 trades prior to the block transaction Permanent price effects is measured as
Net mean and median price effects are reported for block purchases and block sales).
The mean difference and test of difference t-statistics measure and test the difference between the block purchase and sale transactions. Panel B tests the proposition that the permanent price impact asymmetry is higher in bear markets vis-à-vis bull markets. 
Market performance and price impact asymmetry
This figure plots the total and permanent price impact asymmetry between block purchases and sales, and the average S&P 500 monthly index return. Results are presented for each month; the vertical bar divides the sample period into bull and bear markets.
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